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Abstract
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 definition of the firm as a legal fiction which serves as a
nexus for contracts between individuals sits well with the Coasean narrative on the
firm while at the same time being at odds with it. Available interviews with Jensen
shed little light on the origins and meaning of this unusual definition. The article
shows how the definition captured, and was a response to, the American socio-
political context of the early and mid-1970s, and traces how Jensen and Meckling
employed it once they themselves became immersed in the public debate about cor-
porate responsibility and regulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also consid-
ers Jensen and Meckling’s place in the literature on the economics of corporate law
developed mostly in the 1980s.
JEL classifications: B25 , B26 , B31.
1. Introduction
In 1979 the inaugural Leo Melamed Prize, attributed by the University of Chicago’s
Graduate School of Business (GSB) for outstanding scholarship by business school teachers,
was awarded to two former Chicago students, Michael Jensen and William Meckling.1
Since its publication in 1976 in the Journal of Financial Economics, founded by Jensen a
few years earlier at the University of Rochester’s Graduate School of Management (GSM),
the award-winning article, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure (henceforth JM76), has become one of the most cited papers in eco-
nomics (Kim et al., 2006), finance (Arnold et al., 2003), accounting (Chen and Liano,
2009), and corporate governance (Durisin and Puzone, 2009). While this record reflects its
appeal to multiple audiences in economics departments and business schools, the article’s
impact, as this article shows, was also profound in law schools.
It is hard to overstate its influence on corporate finance and financial economics more
generally. JM76 demonstrated that Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller’s (1958)
1 Jensen (b. 1939) earned an MBA (1964) and a PhD (1968) at GSB. Meckling (1921–1998) pursued
postgraduate studies in economics at Chicago (1949–1952), but left without completing his PhD.
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proposition that, given perfect capital markets, the firm’s market value was independent of
its capital structure, was a special case of the Coase theorem, namely something that held
only in the absence of contracting costs and wealth effects. By relaxing these assumptions,
the article showed that the allocation of property rights affected the firm’s financing deci-
sions, thereby paving the way for subsequent developments in the field. The agency theory
it proposed rapidly became a building block of modern finance, alongside the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis, portfolio theory, the capital asset pricing model, and option pricing theory
(Jensen and Smith, 1984).
It is also difficult to exaggerate the article’s importance for corporate governance and
management more generally. JM76 showed that although conflicts of interest between
owners and managers were indeed the source of the managerial negligence and profusion
decried by Adam Smith,2 it was not the case, as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932)
had assumed, that managerial discretion would remain unchecked. Agency costs arising
from the separation of ownership and control could be reduced by contractual arrange-
ments and the operation of what Henry Manne (1965) called the ‘market for corporate
control’, which ensured the timely replacement of underperforming managerial teams.
These claims informed the boom in executive compensation and takeover activity that
came to define the 1980s (Fourcade and Khurana, 2017).
These success stories contrast with the article’s fate in the theory of the firm literature.
On the one hand, JM76 helped do away with the view of the firm as ‘a “black box” oper-
ated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs,
thereby maximizing profits’ (JM76, pp.306–7),3 replacing it with a focus on ‘how the con-
flicting objectives of individuals are brought into equilibrium’ (JM76, p.307) within the
contractual structure of the firm. The depiction of firm as the ‘nexus of a set of contracting
relationships among individuals’ (JM76, p.311) sat well with Coasean insight that central-
ized contractual structures were efficiency-enhancing, and generalized Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz’s (1972) earlier work on owner-managed firms to corporations.
At the same time, the definition of the firm as a ‘legal fiction’, namely an ‘artificial con-
struct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals’ (JM76,
p.310, n12), was, and remains, at odds with the theory of the firm literature. And the add-
itional claim that it ‘makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are
“inside” the firm . . . from those things that are “outside” of it’ (JM76, p.311), which
Jensen and Meckling presented as an implication of their conception of the firm, certainly
departed from the literature’s focus on firm boundaries. As a result, to paraphrase Ronald
Coase (1972), JM76’s definition of the firm came to be much cited but little used, except as
a convenient foil (e.g., Hart, 1989).
In order to shed light on why Jensen and Meckling adopted such an unusual definition
of the firm, this article first turns to the ‘official history’ of JM76 supplied by Jensen in sev-
eral interviews. While instructive, these accounts are incomplete. Jensen tells an essentially
internalist story which explains how the challenges of teaching and the inadequacies of
existing theories of the firm led to the formulation of agency theory. He does not use the
expressions ‘nexus of contracts’ or ‘legal fiction’ and downplays the socio-political context.
This is unsatisfactory, because JM76 explicitly alluded to contemporary ‘popular and
2 Smith’s ([1776] 1937, p.700) observation that negligence and profusion prevailed in joint-stock com-
panies where directors managed other people’s money was chosen as JM76’s epigraph.
3 The now-standard reference to the textbook firm as a ‘black box’ first appeared in JM76.
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professional debates over “social responsibility”’ (JM76, p.307), and seemed to define the
firm in a way that reflected those debates.
Taking 1970 as a starting point, the article examines the context within which JM76
was written, and shows that Jensen and Meckling’s definition captured, and was a response
to, the public debate about corporate responsibility and regulation of the early and mid-
1970s. It then traces how Jensen and Meckling spelled out its meaning and implications
once they themselves joined the fray. The message they conveyed to the business commu-
nity in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that corporations were unlikely to survive add-
itional regulatory burdens imposed by activists and politicians who believed that costs
could be imposed on corporations without harming individuals, particularly stockholders.
The article then highlights the close connections between JM76 and the economics of
corporate law developed over the course of the 1980s by a new breed of corporate lawyers
trained in economics. The influence of JM76’s agency theory was as profound in economics
departments and business schools as it was in law schools. But it was in law schools that
JM76’s definition of the firm truly made an impact. In economics departments and business
schools, it was cited but little used; in law schools, it was cited and used. In effect, JM76
supplied the budding economics of corporate law exactly what it needed: an economic the-
ory of the firm upon which a new legal understanding of the corporation and corporate law
could be built.
2. The official history
Jensen discussed the origins of JM76 in a series of interviews (Chew and Jensen, 2010;
Jensen and Walking, 2010, 2011), all of which refer to it as ‘the agency paper’ (Jensen and
Walking, 2010, p.9; 2011, p.13; Chew and Jensen, 2010, p.16). Jensen’s account of how
his teaching developed (Jensen et al., 1998) provides an additional source. There are also
some secondary sources based on interviews or personal communications with Jensen
(Khurana, 2007; Fox, 2009; Fourcade and Khurana, 2017). According to this official his-
tory, the requirement of relevance in executive education and the realization that the text-
book theory of the firm was problematic led to the development of what became JM76.4
2.1 Breaking open the black box
JM76 was an exemplar of the kind of ambitious research conducted at the Rochester’s
GSM under Meckling’s leadership. Meckling was appointed Dean in 19645 by the univer-
sity’s new President, Allen Wallis, the former Dean of Chicago’s GSB. Meckling sought to
emulate what Wallis had achieved at Chicago, namely to create a distinctive economics-
dominated curriculum. In 1967 he hired Jensen. By the time the first issue of the Journal of
Financial Economics was published in 1974, Meckling had assembled the key faculty that
cemented GSM’s reputation in microeconomics, finance, accounting, monetary theory, and
4 This narrative bears some resemblance to Coase’s (1988) account of how the ideas developed in
his celebrated article on the firm were formed while having to teach a course on the organization
of the business unit, a topic that prevailing conceptions of atomistic competition in markets were
ill-equipped to deal with.
5 GSM was then known as the College of Business Administration. It was renamed GSM in 1970, and
is now known as the Simon Business School.
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macroeconomics: George Benston, Karl Brunner, Ronald Hansen, John Long, Walter Oi,
Clifford Smith, Ross Watts, and Jerold Zimmerman.
Although it was at ‘a time of great intellectual ferment at Rochester’ (Jensen et al.,
1998, p.167) when Jensen and Meckling first became interested in the firm, their work on
the topic was not initially an exercise in high theory. The students enrolled on Rochester’s
Executive Development Program ‘questioned the usefulness of . . . price theory’ (Jensen
et al., 1998, p.166) to the running of businesses, and this prompted them to start teaching it
from a managerial perspective, using ‘the vehicle of . . . a large, multidivisional firm’ (Chew
and Jensen, 2010, p.14). As they examined topics such as transfer pricing and peak-load
pricing, they became themselves ‘captured by the organizational problems’ (Chew and
Jensen, 2010, p.15) being considered.
The ‘actual precipitation of the agency theory paper’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.8)
was an ‘accident’ (Chew and Jensen, 2010, p.17) which ‘came about through Karl
Brunner’, who since his arrival at Rochester in 1971 directed the Center for Research in
Government Policy and Business. Brunner ‘invited us to attend the Interlaken conference
that he had started to bridge the gap between American economists and the much more lib-
eral [i.e., left-leaning] economists in Europe’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.8), and asked
‘us to give what was intended to be a controversial lecture . . . along the lines of what
Milton Friedman was writing . . . in the New York Times Magazine about the same time’
(Chew and Jensen, 2010, p.18), something about ‘the business of business is to maximize
profits’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.8).6
Jensen and Meckling agreed with Friedman’s (1970) portrayal of executives as agents
serving the interests of their principals, the stockholders,7 and set out to ‘translate
Friedman’s journalistic arguments into the language of economics’ (Fox, 2009, p.161). But
‘the more we looked the more we became convinced that we couldn’t say that profit maxi-
mization was a positive description of what went on in firms’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010,
p.8). Since ‘firms don’t act, only individuals act’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.8), and indi-
viduals are self-interested, ‘the likelihood that they would all behave as though a simple
maximizing outcome at the top would occur was close to zero’ (Chew and Jensen, 2010,
pp.18–19). This was the beginning of what they called ‘breaking open the black box of the
firm’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.8).
They began building a model which allowed for conflicts of interests and yielded ‘pre-
dictions about what was happening and how it would evolve’ (Chew and Jensen, 2010,
p.19).8 The key idea was that agency costs, conceptualized as the sum of the principals’
monitoring costs and the agents’ bonding expenditures, plus a form of deadweight loss that
6 Brunner’s invitation could not have been extended before early 1973, when he first conceived the
Interlaken Seminar on Analysis and Ideology (Brunner, 1979, p.viii), but the official history records
the year as 1971 (Fox, 2009, p.161; Fourcade and Khurana, 2017, p.354).
7 Many at Chicago, including Aaron Director, Friedrich Hayek and Wilbur Katz, held this view.
8 This was not the first time that internal conflicts of interest were modelled. Nor was it the first time
that doubts about the profit maximization hypothesis had been raised. In the 1950s and 1960s, simi-
lar observations had produced the managerial theory of the firm, which emphasized management’s
discretion to maximize something other than profits (e.g., sales revenue in Baumol, 1959), as well
as the behavioural theory of the firm, which viewed the firm as a coalition of individuals and groups
with conflicting goals in pursuit of satisfactory, as opposed to optimal, solutions (Cyert and March,
1963). See Elodie Bertrand’s (2016) overview of the history of the theory of the firm.
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they called ‘residual loss’ (see JM76, p.308), had an important role to play.9 This gradually
developed into a discussion of how agency costs varied with the proportion of stock held by
managers. Before long they were examining how agency costs varied with the firm’s ratio
of debt to equity and were affected by the parties’ divergent interests. Jensen recalls:
We focused on the conflicts of interest between managers who were not 100% owners of the
firm and shareholders and bondholders, and we focused on the conflicts between bondholders
and shareholders. (Chew and Jensen, 2010, p.19)
It became clear that the Modigliani–Miller theorem was misguided: a firm’s financing deci-
sions were not a matter of indifference. Moreover, the focus on capital structure obscured
the trade-off between inside and outside equity. Adopting the term ‘ownership structure’,
Jensen and Meckling mobilized the comparative institutional analysis recommended by
Coase (1964) and Demsetz (1969) to propose a model of alternative ownership structures
along the lines intimated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). The model showed that the sep-
aration of ownership and control helped reap the benefits of specialization, and that the
markets for managers and the firm itself helped mitigate the associated agency costs.
Millions of individuals would not be willing to entrust managers with their savings if this
were not the case.
2.2 Initial reception
The first draft was completed in mid-1973.10 Before giving the paper at Brunner’s
Interlaken Seminar in mid-1974, Jensen and Meckling presented it to an audience of ‘col-
leagues and friends’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.9) at the Rochester Finance Workshop,
where attendees included Benston, Smith, Watts, and Zimmerman. Although robust chal-
lenges by otherwise friendly colleagues were the norm,11 the reaction was not quite what
they expected: they ‘ran us out on a rail’, they ‘accused us plagiarizing Armen Alchian’
(Chew and Jensen, 2010, p.19). Alchian had indeed made a number of similar arguments at
an American Enterprise Institute (AEI) symposium on securities regulation that Manne
organized in Washington in 1968 (Manne, 1969), just before he accepted Wallis’s invita-
tion to set up a law school at Rochester. Jensen and Meckling had attended that event.
Alchian argued that the appropriate units of analysis were individuals within firms, ra-
ther than firms themselves, and that interpersonal conflicts of interests resulted in competi-
tion within firms, with the implication that the assignment of property rights, particularly
when as regards what he called the ‘ownership–agency relation’ (Alchian, 1969, p.343),
tended to be efficiency-enhancing. There were similarities with Jensen and Meckling’s pres-
entation, but there were also important differences, not least the specification of agency
costs and the detailed comparative institutional analysis of the trade-offs involved. These
novelties were lost on some members of the audience.
Benston, who had also attended Manne’s AEI symposium, was dismissive: ‘What’s new
here? Accountants have been talking about stewardship accounting for decades.
9 The inclusion of costs incurred not just by the principal but also by the agent was an improvement
on existing discussions (e.g., Ross, 1973).
10 Michael Rozeff, at the time Jensen’s PhD student, recalls (in personal communication) comment-
ing on the first draft before the fall term of 1973.
11 I am grateful to Ronald Hansen, at the time Associate Director of the Center for Research in
Government Policy and Business, for sharing (in personal communication) his recollections.
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Stewardship is another term for agency relations. Accounting arose to control agency prob-
lems’.12 After the presentation, Jensen reports:
Bill and I walked up to his office, never saying a word to each other. I sat on the one side of the
desk and he on the other. He pulled out a cigar, put his feet up on the desk, lit his cigar and said:
‘Well, Mike, we sure didn’t sell that one!’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.9)
As it turned out, the paper nevertheless ‘inspired many at Rochester to tackle new kinds of
organizational problems’ (Jensen et al., 1998, p.167).
Jensen failed to sell the paper in Chicago at the GSB Finance Workshop in early 1975,
where attendees included Fischer Black, Eugene Fama, and Miller. His claim that the chap-
ter in Fama and Miller’s (1972) The Theory of Finance showing that ‘capital structure
didn’t count’ was wrong (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.9)13 did not go down well: ‘they
hated it’ (Chew and Jensen, 2010, p.21). The audience, as Roger Ibbotson recalls,14 was
‘used to seeing more mathematical or empirical papers’, and did not recognize ‘it to be a
seminal paper creating a whole new field’, although ‘Michael [Jensen] pitched the paper
somewhat as if it were’. As it turned out, the paper nevertheless inspired many at Chicago,
including Fama himself, to turn to agency theory.
Perhaps because it presented the Modigliani–Miller framework as an example of what
Demsetz (1969) had called the ‘nirvana approach’, the paper proved to be difficult to pub-
lish. It was rejected when it was first submitted in mid-1975:
We originally submitted it to the Bell Journal of Economics. Oliver Williamson was the editor
at the time and referees turned it down flat. They more than just turned it down; they were
incensed that anybody would even dare to submit a paper like this to the Bell Journal. (Jensen
and Walking, 2010, p.9)
For Jensen, this reaction mirrored the state of the ‘economics profession as a whole’ (Chew
and Jensen, 2010, p.23), which remained reluctant to discard the black box view of the
firm. Also, ‘in those days there wasn’t much of an interest in transaction cost economics’
(Jensen and Walking, 2010, pp.8–9). Fortunately, in late 1975:
Gene [Fama] . . . somehow got a copy of the working paper and sent me an unsolicited accept-
ance for the Journal of Financial Economics . . . I [Jensen] would never have done that myself,
but since Gene did, then I could accept it. (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.9)
They had started the journal because ‘the profession . . . the old guys . . . had very little inter-
est in publishing papers from the younger guys’ (Jensen and Walking, 2011, p.14). The am-
bitious young guys felt ‘very fortunate to be taking part in this revolution in finance from
the old-style finance to modern finance’, and thought they ‘had a monopoly on most of the
good stuff’ (Jensen and Walking, 2011, p.7).15 Jensen predicted that the paper was going to
be ‘very important’, and told Meckling he was planning to ‘exercise [his] rights as Editor to
make it the lead article’ (Jensen and Walking, 2010, p.9). JM76 was published in the fall of
1976.
12 I am grateful to Jerold Zimmerman for sharing (in personal communication) this anecdote.
13 The episode in mentioned in Fama’s (2011) autobiographical essay.
14 In personal communication with the author.
15 Given the paradigm shift the young guys provoked, it did not take long for the Journal of Financial
Economics to rank with established journals (Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984).
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3. JM76’s definition in context
Jensen’s account explains how the search for a more realistic theory of the firm led the de-
velopment of the agency theory. Barring a reference to Friedman’s New York Times
Magazine piece and Brunner’s proposal to debate left-leaning Europeans, the official his-
tory reveals little of the context in which JM76 was written, and does not explain what
Jensen and Meckling had in mind when they defined the firm as a legal fiction. While one
might surmise that, in hindsight, Jensen no longer considers this definition to be central to
the paper’s main argument, it likely did mean something at the time. The key lies in the
JM76’s rejection of the ‘personalization of the firm’.
3.1 Misleading personalization
Jensen and Meckling dismissed the personalization (or personification) of the firm in a
heavily-cited passage of JM76:
The personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as ‘what should be the object-
ive function of the firm’, or ‘does the firm have a social responsibility’ is seriously misleading.
The firm is not an individual. (JM76, p.311, original emphasis)
The reference to the firm’s objective function reflected how the sin of personalization was
routinely committed by economists. Jensen and Meckling’s explicit point was that the black
box view of the firm was seriously misleading because only individuals could act or have
objective functions. Their implicit point was that managerial theories of the firm, which
replaced profits with sales revenue or something of that sort in the firm’s objective function,
were equally misleading. For most interesting questions, the appropriate way to look at
‘firm behaviour’ was to understand how the ‘conflicting objectives of individuals . . . are
brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations’ (JM76, p.311).16
The contractual structure of the firm was efficiency-enhancing when ‘the owners of
labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output’ (JM76, p.311) contracted
with the firm instead of with each other. Transaction costs were reduced thanks to the legal
treatment of firms as if they were individuals with contractual capabilities of their own. But
it was important to keep in mind that lying at the nexus of the contracts making up the firm
was a legal fiction, something that existed only in contemplation of law. Jensen and
Meckling saw the gravest consequences of personalization in the uncritical acceptance of
the fact that the law allowed firms and others organizations to be treated as individuals
(Gindis, 2016). The implications were not addressed in JM76 but were revealed elsewhere.
As Meckling (1976, p.548) explained, the truth was that, stripped to their essentials,
firms were ‘pure conceptual artifacts, even when they are assigned the legal status of indi-
viduals’. Hence when contracting or property rights were legally assigned to firms, those
rights always ultimately belonged to real individuals. By the same token, duties or costs
could only be imposed on individuals. In the end, ‘we can only do things to and for individ-
uals’ (Meckling, 1976, p.548, emphasis in original). These considerations were captured in
the reference to social responsibility in JM76’s dismissal of personalization. In addition to
16 As Jensen (1983, p.328) later clarified, treating the firm as if it were a profit-maximizing individual
could nonetheless be useful. Explanations of how outputs of a firm or industry responded to price
changes, for example, were more productively addressed using the black box view, as long as
one remembered that it was a ‘convenient abstraction’. The influence of Friedman’s (1953) instru-
mentalist methodology is clear.
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being an allusion to Friedman, it provided the link with the contemporary professional and
popular debate. Jensen and Meckling’s definition of the firm was meaningful in that
context.
3.2 Corporate social responsibility and its discontents
Although corporate social responsibility was at the forefront of the public debate in the
early 1970s, calls for executives to embrace social and political responsibilities were hardly
new. At the height of the Great Depression, Berle and Means (1932) wanted business to as-
sume economic statesmanship, and in the 1960s, while economists such as Means (1962)
and John Kenneth Galbraith (1967) argued that self-perpetuating managers could adminis-
ter prices without fear of being replaced, lawyers such as Arthur Miller (1960) and Berle
(1963) promoted the view that large corporations were private governments that had to op-
erate in the public interest. By the late 1960s, however, this was no longer merely an intel-
lectual debate. The counterculture of the 1960s had fuelled the public’s antipathy toward
corporate America. Organized anti-corporate action in the form of picket lines, sit-ins, and
boycotts had become a part of the American political landscape.
In this context, a national debate about corporate misbehaviour, lax safety and environ-
mental standards, and ineffective federal regulatory agencies was spearheaded by Ralph
Nader, an energetic Harvard-trained lawyer that the press described as a ‘self-appointed
lobbyist’.17 Aided by groups of activist students recruited from top law schools—collective-
ly known as ‘Nader’s Raiders’18—and thanks to the receptiveness of many politicians in
Washington to the causes he championed, Nader was behind the adoption of a series of
consumer, worker, and environmental protection regulations in the late 1960s. He was also
instrumental in the creation of new federal agencies.19
In early 1970, a Nader-backed group called Project on Corporate Responsibility
launched Campaign GM to force General Motors to expand its board to representatives of
civil society and create a Committee for Corporate Responsibility to advise management on
matters of public interest. Worried about its image, the firm created a Public Policy
Committee and appointed a member of the civil rights movement to its board. As other
major corporations were targeted, the pressure exercised by what became known as the
‘public interest movement’ (Vogel, 1978) continued to build up, with the backing of the
voting public.20 As Paul Samuelson (1971, p.xxi) put it, ‘it is not primarily hippies or acti-
vists who mutter, “Right on,” when Nader’s legions castigate General Motors’, but ‘many
of the readers of Time magazine’.
High-profile business leaders, including David Rockefeller and Eli Goldston, at the time
a Director of the NBER, advocated corporate charitable giving and called for business to
play a greater role in society. The Committee for Economic Development, a business-led
public policy think tank, argued that business statesmanship was in business’ ‘enlightened
self-interest’ in a number of reports, including A New Rationale for Corporate Social
17 ‘Ralph Nader, Crusader; Or, the Rise of the Self-Appointed Lobbyist’, New York Times Magazine, 29
October 1967.
18 ‘Nader’s Raiders: The Lone Ranger Gets a Posse’, Life, 3 October 1969.
19 Most notably the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environment Protection
Agency.
20 ‘The Harris Survey: Public Support for Nader Rises Steadily’, Washington Post, 18 December
1972.
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Policy, released in 1970, in which William Baumol pointed out that, as with other public
goods, philanthropic and social responsibility services were likely to be underprovided by
business. ‘Institutional support’ in the form of ‘taxes, regulations, and legal remedies’,
Kenneth Arrow (1973, pp.316–17) reasoned, was required.21
In this spirit, Nader and a group of raiders called Corporate Accountability Research
Group proposed a systemic solution in a highly-publicized book, Taming the Giant
Corporation (Nader et al., 1976a). It argued that ‘megacorporations’ were private govern-
ments serving a broad range of constituencies (Nader et al., 1976a, p.8), but that a ‘perverse
form of forum-shopping inspired by the states with the most lax corporate laws’ (Nader
et al., 1976a, p.246) perpetuated managerial entrenchment, to the detriment of investors,
employees, consumers, and the wider community. To eliminate the Delaware-led race ‘race
to the bottom’ denounced by William Cary (1974), Nader proposed that the largest corpo-
rations be chartered by the federal government itself.
Corporate reformers were persuaded that if ever there was a time to push for substantive
changes in the operation of American corporations, then surely this was it. Public confi-
dence in business was at an all-time low (Silk and Vogel, 1976). In a decade that began
with the bankruptcy of Penn Central, ‘the most spectacular case of corporate mismanage-
ment in recent history’,22 the energy crisis led many to accuse oil companies of profiteering.
While the country was still reeling from the Watergate revelations, the news was dominated
by a series of large-scale foreign corruption scandals, which the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) described as the ‘second half of Watergate, and by far the larger half’.23
In early 1976, the Senate Committee on Commerce announced that hearings on
Corporate Rights and Responsibilities would be held to evaluate the case for federal char-
tering. The hearings’ significance was potentially profound: any ‘law or set of laws’ emerg-
ing from this legislative process could have ‘as much impact on the conduct of business . . .
as the New Deal reforms did in the 1930s’.24 Nader and his co-authors were invited to test-
ify. On the eve of the hearings in the summer of 1976, the Committee’s witness list also fea-
tured representatives of employer associations, trade unions, the SEC, the Delaware Bar
Association, and a range of business executives and academics, among whom Manne.
Opponents of corporate reform had initially struggled to make their voice heard in the
Nader-dominated public debate. Tellingly, perhaps, despite being a response to Campaign
GM, Friedman’s New York Time Magazine piece had not mentioned Nader. It was Manne
who first took the gloves off in the business press (Manne, 1970, 1971). Like Friedman,
Manne affirmed the principle that management’s sole duty was to maximize profits on be-
half of the corporation’s owners, but unlike Friedman, Manne portrayed Nader as an unin-
formed zealot whose positions lacked empirical support. This was the stance that Manne,
soon described as ‘Ralph Nader’s most outspoken critic’,25 was the most active in convey-
ing throughout the first half of the 1970s.
21 Arrow, Baumol, James Buchanan, Roland McKean, Edmund Phelps, William Vickrey, and others
addressed these topics at a 1972 Russell Sage Foundation conference on ‘Altruism, Morality and
Economic Theory’ (Phelps, 1975). Other economists working on these themes included Neil
Chamberlain, Neil Jacoby, and Henry Wallich. See Preston’s (1975) overview.
22 ‘Penn Central: The Unanswered Question,’ Forbes, 15 December 1970.
23 ‘How Clean Is Business?’ Newsweek, 1 September 1975.
24 ‘A Step Toward the Federal Corporate Charter’, Business Week, 21 June 1976.
25 ‘Meet Ralph Nader’s Most Outspoken Critic’, Business Week, 24 July 1971.
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Manne was particularly perplexed to see business leaders subscribe to the idea of cor-
porate social responsibility. Given their experience of dealing with ‘disparate individual
interests in large corporations’, it was surprising that they were willing to entertain the idea
that corporations could have interests separate from those of individuals (Manne, 1973,
p.709). ‘Many corporate officials’, he regretted, ‘sounding . . . oddly like Ralph Nader, cher-
ish the myth of a collective, substantive existence for corporations, as though the companies
themselves could bear costs without passing them along to real live human beings’ (Manne,
1975, p.27). His testimony, given on the same day as Nader, developed these ideas.
Nader viewed the hearings as an opportunity to ‘initiate the greatest public debate on
the role of the giant corporation in American history’ (Nader et al., 1976b, p.197).26
Contrary to the claims of his detractors, he insisted, the federal chartering proposal was not
about the creation of vast discretionary powers in Washington, but about using the instru-
ment of federal charters to redefine the place of business in society. Charters were in effect
contracts between corporations and the state: ‘government provides the charter to the cor-
poration, exchanging considerable privileges . . . in return for certain standards that have to
be observed’ (Nader et al., 1976b, p.207).
Manne was not impressed. ‘A little knowledge of the workings of our economic system’,
he countered, ‘would go a long way to counter simplistic thinking’ (Manne, 1976, p.241)
professed by ‘would-be economic tinkerers’ (Manne, 1976, p.225) such as Nader.
Referring the Committee to Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) ‘classic analysis’ of the firm as
an example of the ‘new and sophisticated theories to explain the corporate system’ and the
‘complex organizational mechanism’ known as the corporation, Manne (1976, pp.236–37)
pointed out that these had yet to permeate the ‘popular or journalistic’ debate ‘or the more
narrowly legal writings on the subject’, which all too often viewed corporations as political,
as opposed to economic, entities.
One could not ignore, Manne (1976, p.236) explained, the ‘fundamental role played by
market forces in the design, the structure, and the performance of modern corporate enter-
prise’. In particular, one could not snub ‘the most exhaustive and conclusive series of empir-
ical studies done on any aspect of modern economic theory’, namely the ‘now famous
“efficient market hypothesis”,’ which showed that share prices ‘reflect with extreme accur-
acy and speed all information’ (Manne, 1976, p.226) investors needed to make the right
decisions.27 Underperforming corporate boards could not go undetected for long; their re-
placement was inevitable.
Ultimately, corporations were merely ‘complex congeries of interacting private contrac-
tual arrangements’ (Manne, 1976, p.236) between individuals seeking personal gain. There
was no contract with the state. And there certainly was no such thing as corporate responsi-
bility: ‘a corporation is not such an entity or a being that can have ethical attributes, or an
altruistic spirit, or a social responsibility’ (Manne, 1976, p.227). Indeed:
We are learning in our study of corporate organizations . . . that the only and ultimate unit of
analysis is individuals, only individuals have incentives, constraints, motivations, responsibilities
. . . The corporation is . . . a legal fiction. (Manne, 1976, pp.228–9)
26 Quotes are taken from oral testimonies and written statements.
27 Jensen (1978, p.95) likewise wrote: ‘I believe there is no other proposition in economics which has
more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis.’
D. GINDIS 975
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/oep/article/72/4/966/5899892 by guest on 27 O
ctober 2020
These were Jensen and Meckling’s arguments in a nutshell. While it may not be possible to
show how exactly they came to use the expression ‘legal fiction’,28 their definition of the
firm was linked to the rejection of the personalization of the firm, and was meaningful
within the socio-political context of the mid-1970s. It is also possible to interpret the claim
that it ‘makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are “inside” the firm
. . . from those things that are “outside” of it’ (JM76, p.311) as a critique of the notion of
the ‘giant corporation’. Corporate size was not the issue, for Jensen and Meckling. What
mattered was the contractual allocation of property rights.
4. How JM76’s definition was put to use
Federal chartering never passed the Committee stage of the legislative process, but the push
for corporate reform in the name of social responsibility seemed to be spreading. Jensen
and Meckling became directly involved in the public debate, effectively replacing Manne as
leading Nader critics. As they spelled out the implications of the personalization of firm in
ways that mattered to the business community, the first econometric study to refute
Nader’s agenda was being developed by Jensen’s students at Rochester. The results, along
with the key messages of JM76, were integrated into the new literature on the economics of
corporate law which Manne successfully promoted in law schools.
4.1 Can the corporation survive?
Corporate reformers had every reason to be optimistic in 1977. Following his election,
Jimmy Carter appointed several Nader loyalists in his administration, while the Federal
Trade Commission set up a Task Force on Corporate Accountability. The following year, a
Senate Advisory Committee on Corporate Governance was appointed, and the American
Law Institute (ALI) initiated its Corporate Governance Project. Reform, it seemed, was im-
minent.29 As SEC Chairman Harold Williams (1978, p.1) admitted, one could not rule out
a ‘jump in the degree to which that law controls the exercise of corporate power and au-
thority’. While the business press exposed the dangers of regulatory overkill, Jensen and
Meckling asked: ‘Can the Corporation Survive?’
They had written a Center for Research in Government Policy and Business working
paper under this title in mid-1976,30 and had published it in Financial Analysts Journal in
1978. Jensen and Meckling’s answer was dire:
We believe that the era of dramatic economic growth is over . . . because government is destroy-
ing the system of contract rights, which has been the wellspring of our economic growth. The
corporate form of organization . . . is likely to disappear completely. Even if it survives in some
form the larger corporations as we know them are destined to be destroyed. (Jensen and
Meckling, 1978, p.32, original emphasis)
This forecast had a ‘high probability of being realized’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1978, p.37)
unless the gradual encroachment of government was curbed. Recent attacks on corpora-
tions, they pointed out in a companion paper published in The Banker, followed a recurring
28 Michael Jensen (in personal communication) has no precise recollection.
29 ‘Governance of U.S. Companies: Proposals on Reform Likely Soon’, New York Times, 24 February
1978.
30 It was cited in JM76.
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pattern: ‘they usually involve hearings by the Congress’ and ‘often there is some “public
interest” group in the background—like Nader’s Raiders’ (Meckling and Jensen, 1977,
p.46) seeking to impose additional responsibilities on executives. Activists, their political
allies, and their enablers in the press failed to see that this involved transferring wealth
from the owners of corporations to these other groups, because they believed that costs
could be imposed on corporations without harming individuals. As they had argued in
JM76, albeit not in so many words:
The corporation is only a convenient legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a very complex set
of contract rights between individuals. The costs and benefits allegedly imposed on the corpor-
ation are in fact imposed on the human parties to the contracts (explicit or implicit) and merely
effected through the corporation. (Jensen and Meckling, 1978, p.36)
The more social responsibilities were imposed on executives, the higher the costs of running
corporations, and the lower the value of the stockholders’ residual claims. The fall in the
value of corporate securities reduced capitalization, which in turn affected the viability of
the financial claims underpinning corporations. The system of private property rights sus-
taining markets was in danger. In fact, as there will always be alliances between special
interest groups seeking to improve their welfare at the expense of investors and politicians
seeking to enhance the scope of their decision-making powers, the collapse of the American
free enterprise system was only a matter of time. ‘We hope that bringing the problem to the
attention of the public’, wrote Jensen and Meckling (1978, p.37), ‘will generate a solution’.
The key message, that ‘if you look at a corporation as nothing but a set of contracts . . .
what really hits you over the head is the vulnerability of all those contractual claims’, as
Jensen and Meckling put it in a mid-1976 Forbes interview,31 was delivered to a broad
audience. Prior to its publication in 1978, ‘Can the Corporate Survive?’ appeared in several
corporate and industry newsletters, as the cover story of MBA Magazine, in the American
Institute for Economic Research’s Economic Education Bulletin and, with an introduction
by Alchian, as a pamphlet circulated by the International Institute for Economic Research
(IIER).32 It was quoted widely in the national press. Additional jargon-free papers, bearing
titles such as Freedom and the Role of Government (Jensen, 1977a) and The Debasement
of Contracts and the Decline of Capital Markets (Jensen, 1977b), drove the point home.
In 1979 Can the Corporation Survive? was awarded the Financial Analysts Federation’s
prestigious Graham and Dodd Plaque, despite the fact that it did not contain the type of
mathematical analyses normally awarded the prize.33 A few months earlier, one could read
the following in the Wall Street Journal34:
Until now proponents of federal chartering have faced two main problems. One is that the
clamor for federal chartering has not come from investors . . . The other is the remarkable study
by Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling [which] concluded that the main threats to
stockholders’ wealth are federal laws . . . that diminish the value of securities by reducing the
property rights of the owners . . . Now advocates of federal chartering face a third problem—an
empirical one. In a study of the Managerial Economics Research Center at the University of
Rochester, Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich tested the claim the competition among states for
31 ‘As We See It’, Forbes, 15 June 1976.
32 Alchian (1976) endorsed and cited it in his imaginary dialogue with Adam Smith.
33 Modigliani and William Sharpe were among its previous recipients.
34 ‘Facts on Federal Chartering’, Wall Street Journal, 28 November 1978.
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corporate charters results in a reduction of stockholders’ wealth . . . They conclude: ‘The evi-
dence presented here lends no support to the argument . . . Empirical science has a way of dis-
arming rhetoric.
The results of this first econometric study of the race to the bottom argument which under-
pinned Nader’s federal chartering campaign, conducted by Jensen’s students at the
Managerial Economics Research Center he had set up earlier that year, were crucial. They
showed that jurisdictional competition on the supply side and freedom to incorporate in
any state on the demand side created benefits for investors: Delaware captured a large share
of the market for corporate charters not because its corporate law regime favoured manage-
ment but because it helped reduce investment costs. Other states copied Delaware’s corpor-
ate law for this reason. Although further testing was needed, the study’s reliance on
‘empirical science’ stood in stark contrast, Dodd and Leftwich (1980, p.260) observed,
with the attitude of ‘proponents of federal chartering’, who saw fit to initiate congressional
hearings yet ‘present[ed] no empirical evidence’.
Heavy regulation pushed by the White House had by this time become unlikely—the
Carter administration had already initiated the era of deregulation—but federal chartering,
and Nader himself, remained the focus of the anti-regulatory counter-attack (Winter, 1978;
Hessen, 1979; Weidenbaum, 1979). Hostility towards the American corporate system was
still present, and the critique of the giant corporation, which Nader represented, remained
a rallying point. Ronald Reagan’s election in late 1980 did not alter this state of affairs.
Regulation by agencies such as the SEC remained a possibility, and it was unclear how the
ALI Corporate Governance Project would lean.
These questions were addressed at a major conference on corporate governance organ-
ized at UCLA in early 1981, where Jensen warned an audience of academics, executives,
and industry professionals that when reformers and their political allies called for managers
to pursue social responsibilities, what they really wanted was ‘control over the use of the
wealth currently owned by the parties to the contracts that make up the corporation’
(Jensen and Meckling, 1983, p.300). The argument was next presented at a Rochester sym-
posium under the title ‘Reflections on the Corporation as a Social Invention’ (Meckling and
Jensen, 1982), which circulated as an IIER pamphlet prior to its publication in Midland
Corporate Finance Journal (Meckling and Jensen, 1983), a bank-sponsored review address-
ing the business community. It, too, lamented the vulnerability of stockholder rights.
4.2 JM76 and the economics of corporate law
Meckling retired in mid-1983. He did not attend the Hoover Institution conference on
‘Corporations and Private Property’ organized in late 1982 to mark the fiftieth anniversary
of Berle and Means (1932), which the organizers presented as the source of Nader’s errone-
ous views. Jensen and Manne, as well as Daniel Fischel and Frank Easterbrook, two early
stars of the economics of corporate law, were present.35 In the resulting special issue of the
Journal of Law and Economics, Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) showed how contractual
arrangements mitigated agency costs and protected shareholders’ residual claims.
Meanwhile, the Journal of Financial Economics ran a symposium on ‘The Market for
35 Means also attended. Other attendees included Demsetz, Fama, Robert Hessen, Benjamin Klein,
Douglass North, George Stigler, and Oliver Williamson.
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Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’ to take stock of what was known about the
market forces involved (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Both issues highlighted the close connections between the latest economic thinking on
corporations and the best available scientific evidence. In the early 1970s, the emphasis on
this connection was a defining feature of Manne’s dispute with Nader.36 As his testimony
at the 1976 hearings revealed, Manne believed that progress in the economic understanding
of the corporation and the corporate system more generally had yet to permeate the popu-
lar debate and the legal writings on the subject. Manne took it upon himself to ensure that
matters did not remain in that state.
The bulk of his efforts went into the promotion of economic tools and techniques
among lawyers, judges, and other legal professions. In 1971, while still at Rochester,
Manne launched a series of summer Economics Institutes for Law Professors, at which the
principles of economics taught primarily by Alchian and Demsetz were applied to various
topics, including corporations. These courses served as a blueprint for subsequent training
programmes offered by the Law and Economics Center (LEC) he set up at the University of
Miami on his arrival in 1974. Over the next few years, the LEC offered economics training
for law review editors, Congressional staff aides, government officials, and federal judges
(Butler, 1999; Gindis, 2020).
Among other efforts to rectify popular beliefs, the LEC’s widely-distributed Corporate
Issues Sourcebook, a collection of digestible essays by Manne, Benston, Demsetz, and
others, gave students, executives, investors, and the public insights into ‘modern thinking
about the economics of the corporate enterprise’ (Manne, 1978, p.xiv). Almost every chap-
ter presented the reformers’ evidence as anecdotal. Readers were warned against political
conceptions of corporations, and referred to JM76 on the nature and benefits of corpora-
tions. When the LEC launched an Advanced Course on Corporate Governance and
Financial Markets at Emory in 1982, it was only natural for Meckling, and later Jensen, to
be among the instructors. JM76’s place in the new economics of corporate law had by then
been secured.
Hence Richard Posner and Kenneth Scott’s (1980) Economics of Corporation Law and
Securities Regulation, which first assembled the field’s main strands in the form a reader
designed as a teaching tool for corporate law professors, opened with excerpts from Coase
(1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and JM76 on the economics of the firm.37 This was
followed by readings on corporate social responsibility and the race to the bottom argu-
ment, which portrayed Nader and others as ignorant of both the preceding material and
Dodd and Leftwich’s (1980) empirical results, an extract of which was provided. The
book’s subsequent treatment of insider trading, disclosure requirements, dividend policy, fi-
duciary duties, and investor protection was infused with the concept of agency costs, and
strongly supported the Manne’s (1967, p.284) conjecture that ‘market forces rather than
legal ones have dictated [the] organization and structure’ of large corporations.
The research programme he had called for throughout the 1960s was finally taking
shape. When he started out, Manne (1962) could only observe that little was known about
the economic forces at work. The empirical evidence supporting what became known as
the efficient market hypothesis soon allowed him to argue that the market for corporate
36 It also characterized his debate with Berle in the 1960s.
37 JM76 still appears as a key reading on the economics of the firm in the latest anthology (Hill and
McDonnell, 2016).
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control helped curb managerial discretion (Manne, 1965). He then turned his attention to
the economics of securities regulation (Manne, 1969), but left things there, and ‘never pro-
duced’, as Gordon Tullock (1969, p.291, emphasis in original) lamented, ‘his General
Theory of Corporations’.
In its absence, Manne’s project could not really get off the ground. Indeed, there were
only rudimentary things to say about corporate law. Posner’s (1973) Economic Analysis of
Law, for example, attempted to apply transaction cost analysis to corporate law. It intro-
duced Coase’s theory of the firm but, realizing it was not designed to explain corporations,
relied mostly on the black box view. Basic assumptions about conflicts of interests and a
suitable comparative institutional analysis were missing. While Alchian and Demsetz
(1972) initiated work along these lines, it was JM76’s agency cost-minimization perspective
that provided the appropriate framework and captured a detailed array of relevant trade-
offs. The theory of the firm it proposed was general, applicable to any legal form of the
firm.
JM76 offered Manne’s project a theory of its main object of analysis. It also provided a
theory of ownership structures that was readily combined with the idea that market forces
helped protect shareholder interests. The final element that Manne’s project needed was
supplied by the Dodd and Leftwich study of jurisdictional competition, which showed that
the content of corporate law itself was also driven by market forces. Over the course of the
1980s, a new generation of corporate lawyers trained in economics integrated these ideas
to propose that the function of corporate law was to help private parties reduce agency and
other contracting costs.38 This claim had a profound impact on the trajectory of corporate
law scholarship, and shaped what would become the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance in the early 1990s (Cheffins, 2013).
A distinctive feature of this literature, culminating with Easterbrook and Fischel’s
(1991) The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, was the systematic reference to JM76’s
definition of firm. By the end of the 1980s, as one observer noted, ‘a revolution, under the
banner “nexus of contracts,” . . . swept the legal theory of the corporation’ (Kornhauser,
1989, p.1449). In the process, as another put it, the ‘core notion’ that the firm is a legal fic-
tion was ‘accorded the weight of scientific truth: it [was] received in the legal literature as
an ontological discovery with immediate and significant implications’ (Bratton, 1989,
p.409). Jensen, by then at Harvard, had already turned his attention to other matters.39
5. Conclusion
JM76’s definition of the firm as a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set of contracts
among individuals sits well with the theory of the firm narrative inherited from Coase while
at the same time being at odds with it. The official history of JM76 offers few explanations
as to why such an unusual definition was adopted. This article has argued that the defin-
ition makes sense once the socio-political context within which JM76 was written is taken
into account. Furthermore, it has shown that when Jensen and Meckling got immersed in
38 Besides Easterbrook, Fischel, Posner, and Scott, this group included Barry Baysinger, Henry
Butler, Ronald Gilson, William Klein, Jonathan Macey, Joel Mofsky, Larry Ribstein, Fred
McChesney, Roberta Romano, and Ralph Winter.
39 Jensen moved to Harvard Business School in 1984 on a part-time basis, before making a definite
move in 1989. From 1984 he focused on mergers and executive compensation.
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the public debate about corporate responsibility and regulation in the late 1970s and early
1980s, their message that private corporations were unlikely to survive additional regula-
tory burdens followed from their definition of the firm.
The insight that behind the legal fiction were vulnerable stockholders, who not only had
to deal with opportunistic managers but also bear the costs of corporate regulation, was
mobilized in the economics of corporate law literature developed in the 1980s. In effect,
JM76 provided a theory-of-the-firm foundation for this literature’s central claims that mar-
ket forces had moulded existing corporate features, and that any proposed regulation had
to be assessed in light of its effect on agency and other contracting costs. Part of the reason
why scholars involved in provoking a paradigm shift in the legal understanding of corpora-
tions had a lasting influence on the corporate governance debate was that they were able to
claim that their work was grounded in the latest economic science.
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